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Abstract
The number of psychologists whose work crosses cultural boundaries is increasing. Without a 
critical awareness of their own cultural grounding, they risk imposing the assumptions, concepts, 
practices, and values of U.S.-centered psychology on societies where they do not fit, as a brief 
example from the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami shows. Hermeneutic thinkers offer theoretical 
resources for gaining cultural awareness. Culture, in the hermeneutic view, is the constellation of 
meanings that constitutes a way of life. Such cultural meanings – especially in the form of folk 
psychologies and moral visions – inevitably shape every psychology, including U.S. psychology. 
The insights of hermeneutics, as well as its conceptual resources and research approaches, open 
the way for psychological knowledge and practice that are more culturally situated.
Keywords
International psychology; cultural psychology; indigenous psychology; folk psychology; 
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As in other spheres of contemporary life, psychologists are crossing international borders 
with increasing frequency. Some cultural psychologists have long hoped that such increased 
cross-cultural contact and communication would disrupt the entrenched parochialism and 
ethnocentrism of U.S. psychology (e.g., Marsella, Tharp, & Ciborowski, 1979; Pedersen, 
1979; Sue & Sue, 1977). Such cross-cultural contact, they believed, would necessarily result 
in greater reflexivity regarding the cultural roots of U.S. psychology. But this promise has 
not been fulfilled. U.S. psychology remains not only overwhelmingly U.S.-centric but also 
largely unaware of how its cultural roots shape theory and research. As Arnett (2008) has 
pointed out, the population from which U.S. psychologists draw their research samples 
Correspondence concerning this article may be directed to John Christopher, johnchristopherphd@gmail.com. Hanover Psychiatry, 
Dartmouth College, 23 South Main St., #2B, Hanover, NH 03755, USA. 
HHS Public Access
Author manuscript
Am Psychol. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2015 October 01.
Published in final edited form as:
Am Psychol. 2014 October ; 69(7): 645–655. doi:10.1037/a0036851.
Author M
anuscript
Author M
anuscript
Author M
anuscript
Author M
anuscript
constitutes less than 5 percent of the world’s population. Similarly, an analysis by Henrich 
and colleagues showed that most psychological knowledge is based on “WEIRD” 
participants (i.e., those from Western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic 
societies; Henrich, Heine, & Norenzavan, 2010). This research suggests that U.S. 
psychologists are prone to generalize from a narrow set of U.S.-based data.
Below, we first describe some difficulties that arise when U.S. psychologists work across 
cultural borders without acknowledging the cultural specificity of their knowledge and 
practices. We draw on first-person experiences of humanitarian relief efforts following the 
2004 Asian tsunami, as well as on a broader consideration of the expansion of clinical and 
counseling psychology across international borders. In our view, the neglect of culture, 
along with the readiness to draw universal generalizations from U.S. data, is not a chance 
occurrence; it is a result of cultural values and assumptions of mainstream U.S. psychology. 
Drawing on the work of hermeneutic thinkers, we argue that, far from being peripheral, 
culture is central to human experience. We argue further that every psychology is 
necessarily culture-bound, rendering all psychologies—including U.S. psychology—
indigenous psychologies. Finally, we conclude with recommendations inspired by 
hermeneutic thinkers for greater cultural awareness in psychology.
Reflections on the 2004 Asian Tsunami
Well-intentioned efforts by U.S. psychologists to reach beyond U.S. borders have been 
criticized as drawing upon U.S.-centered models, knowledge, and practices with insufficient 
regard for the cultural sensibilities of those they serve (Watters, 2010). Consider, for 
example, this brief recounting of the activities of some psychologists who rushed to Sri 
Lanka in the aftermath of the Indian Ocean tsunami of 2004. One of the authors (JM) was 
living and working in Sri Lanka when the tsunami hit this small Indian Ocean island. The 
massive waves, caused by an earthquake off the coast of Sumatra, devastated coastal 
communities along two-thirds of Sri Lanka’s coastline. Over 36,000 lives and 300,000 
homes were lost within minutes. Roads, railways, markets, businesses, schools, places of 
worship, and fishing fleets were washed away (cf. McGilvray & Gamburd, 2011).
People in the devastated areas gave priority to securing shelter, food, and clothing for 
themselves and their children, as well as items for daily use such as cooking utensils, 
sleeping mats, soap, medicine, towels, and diapers. In the makeshift tent villages, women 
and girls were concerned to find private places for bathing and toileting, as well as safe 
places where they could sleep without fear of sexual molestation (Galappatti, 2005). Tracing 
and re-uniting with missing family members (i.e., the extensive kin networks that count as 
family for Sri Lankans) was of paramount importance. Recovering the bodies of dead kin 
and carrying out proper funeral rites were key obligations for survivors, as well as a source 
of solace (Sumathipala, Siribaddana, & Perera, 2006). Settling children back into a school-
going routine was also important; government schools reopened just eight days after the 
tsunami hit, holding open-air classes where buildings had been washed away.
Within a matter of days following the tsunami, masses of trained and untrained helpers—
including many psychologists from Western high-income countries such as the U.S.—
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arrived in Sri Lanka. The foreigners, though well-intended, came with priorities and 
assumptions quite different from those of local people. For instance, Western-trained mental 
health professionals presumed that post-traumatic stress disorder, depression, and suicide 
would reach epidemic proportions (Watters, 2010). Local experts predicted otherwise, and 
there in fact was not an increase in suicide or suicidal behavior, or in admissions to 
psychiatric services (the only available form of mental health care), in the tsunami-affected 
areas (Rodrigo, McQillin, & Pimm, 2009).
The cultural misunderstandings and missteps of foreign helpers were not limited to 
erroneous expectations regarding psychiatric disorders. Psychologists and other helpers 
came equipped to deliver Western-derived interventions, such as eye movement 
desensitization and reprocessing therapy, critical incident stress debriefing, grief counseling, 
exposure therapies, play therapy, and various cognitive behavioral therapy regimens. Such 
therapeutic technologies often flew in the face of local ways of being, local ideas of 
appropriate social interaction, and local norms regarding privacy, dignity, emotional display, 
personal comportment, and family solidarity (Wickramage, 2006). For example, some 
foreign psychologists organized group-based programs and therapeutic exercises in ways 
that violated the strictures of segregation by caste, religion, and sex that underpin local 
social organizations and stratification. For the most part, these violations were unwitting, but 
sometimes they were deliberate. (“We need to teach those people some things.”) Some 
psychologists, unaware of the intense personal and familial shame associated with madness 
(pissu) and mental illness (manasika rogayak), attempted to offer one-on-one counseling, 
which would have singled out individuals as mentally ill. Others, unaware that florid public 
displays of emotion are strictly proscribed in Hindu and Buddhist cultures, compelled people 
to take part in group sessions devoted to emotional catharsis. (“Cry! Cry! It will make you 
feel better.”) Although he was trained in Western biomedicine, Mahesan Ganesan—a local 
psychiatrist who served the stricken area—described the foreign helpers’ “medical model 
orientation” and “lack of consideration of local culture and structures” as “disappointing and 
sometimes shocking” (2011, p. 360).
Had foreign psychologists consulted with local psychosocial experts (or worked 
cooperatively with them), they could have learned about local ways of being and behaving, 
folk psychologies, and moral visions of those they intended to help. Psychologized views of 
suffering seldom figured in local understandings, and local people (whether victims, village 
heads, government relief officials, psychiatrists, or psychosocial workers) did not envision a 
need to alleviate such suffering by psychotherapeutic technologies. The Sutta of Kisa 
Gotami, a story about a mother whose child has died, was well known among local 
Buddhists. It teaches that “lamentation, complaint, and grieving” only increase sorrow, but 
by becoming composed, one can attain peace of mind. According to Ganesan, tsunami 
survivors were guided by this core Buddhist ethos: “To suffer is to survive. To bear it with 
grace and dignity is to live” (as qtd. in Norman, 2008).
Without such knowledge, a good deal of foreign psychologists’ efforts was arguably wasted. 
Moreover, in some instances, their actions had negative consequences for those they 
intended to help (Ganesan, 2006). Local anxieties were heightened by culturally 
inappropriate demands to disclose private information about oneself or one’s family in 
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community “awareness sessions.” Family conflicts sometimes arose in the wake of such 
disclosures. Furthermore, individuals recruited for one-on-one counseling found themselves 
the target of gossip and teasing. Inter-communal dissension sometimes broke out over 
perceptions that foreigners favored one community over another. The cavalier use of critical 
incident stress debriefing, some reported, exacerbated stress responses rather than relieving 
them (Wickramage, 2006). Indeed, as foreign helpers usurped scarce resources (such as 
food, clean water, petrol, vehicles, and housing), the national press came to dub them “the 
second tsunami” (see Wessells, 2009, p. 849).
The mismatch between foreign psychologists’ skills and knowledge and tsunami victims’ 
needs is perhaps not surprising when we consider the literature concerning the 
internationalization of clinical and counseling psychology. Thus far, this literature has given 
little attention to culture-specific forms of psychological suffering. Instead, U.S.-based 
writers have typically reported on the growth of clinical and counseling psychology across 
the world in terms of enrollment in degree programs, accreditation, credentialing and 
licensure; and organizational roles and relations with other helping professionals and non-
professionals (e.g., Leung & Zhang, 1995; Stevens & Wedding, 2004). Local systems and 
practices for ameliorating psychological suffering (e.g., reliance on family and community 
networks, ritual healers, faith-based approaches, composing the mind via meditative or 
contemplative practice) are seldom discussed and, worse, sometimes denigrated outright. 
The burgeoning body of research by anthropologists, cultural psychologists, and 
transcultural psychiatrists concerning local healing systems and practices is often 
unacknowledged. Although some psychologists are indeed sensitive to such issues, an 
unspoken assumption is that psychology is limited to psychology as currently imagined and 
practiced in the U.S. (Arnett, 2008). This narrow field of vision inhibits U.S. psychologists 
from recognizing that every psychology, including U.S. psychology, is inevitably 
indigenous; that is, it is embedded in and a product of the surrounding culture and local 
societal conditions.
Even when psychologists recognize bodies of psychological knowledge other than their 
own, this knowledge is often appropriated for the goals and priorities of Western 
psychology. For example, although Uichol Kim and colleagues have made important 
contributions to mainstream psychology’s appreciation of indigenous psychologies, their 
work is framed within a (Western) positivist philosophy of science, in which the goal to 
“create a more rigorous, systematic, and universal science” (Kim, Park, & Park, 2007, p. 
151). Furthermore, Kim et al. assert that in order for scholars to use indigenous concepts 
from “philosophical” and “religious” texts, they “must first translate them into psychological 
concepts or theories” (p. 454). This unexplained requirement reflects the scientific ideal of 
sharply separating psychology from philosophy and religion. This inevitably gives priority 
to Western psychological constructs. We worry that an agenda such as that of Kim and his 
colleagues prevents indigenous psychologies from being seen as beneficial in their own 
right, not solely for what they might contribute to a grand theoretical project adjudicated by 
Western-educated referees. This worry is substantiated by their curious choice of a particular 
U.S.-based psychological theory (Bandura’s agentic transactional model) as “the scientific 
foundation of indigenous psychology,” based on the broad claim that “people are agents 
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motivated to control their lives and to attain desirable goals and avoid undesirable 
consequences” (Kim & Park, 2006, p. 31, italics added; cf. Kim, Park, & Park, 1999; see 
Allwood, 2011, for an expanded critique of Kim et al.’s work).
U.S. psychologists have paid increasing attention to cultural differences in the last few 
decades. However, they have paid less attention to the concept of culture. As many theorists 
have noted, psychologists often have conceptualized (and operationalized) culture in 
inadequate ways (e.g., Adams & Markus, 2001; Christopher & Bickhard, 2007; Hermans & 
Kempen, 1998; Jahoda, 2002; Kashima, 2000; and Shweder, 1991). For example, culture is 
sometimes treated as a nuisance variable that interferes with the discovery of universals. 
Sometimes it is mistakenly rendered as a demographic variable and used interchangeably 
with terms such as race, ethnicity, and national identity. Cultures are often confused with 
countries and treated as if they were geographic territories. And culture is often granted 
agentic force in determining the thoughts and actions of those “in” it. By contrast, the 
culture theorists noted above view culture as meanings and practices that are shared by a 
social group and constitutive of a way of life.
We now turn to a consideration of hermeneutics, a body of thought that provides a rich set 
of conceptual tools and methods of inquiry for studying culture. Like the culture theorists 
described above, hermeneutic thinkers view culture as the meanings, significations, and 
practices shared by a social group. Further, they see such shared meanings as the context in 
which selves are inextricably embedded. Hermeneutics offers an avenue for psychologists 
interested in rethinking the study of culture in our discipline.
Hermeneutics and Critical Cultural Awareness
Originating among German philosophers (notably, Martin Heidegger and Hans-Georg 
Gadamer) and continuing with scholars in North America such as anthropologist Clifford 
Geertz and philosopher Charles Taylor, hermeneutics developed as an alternative to 
positivist social science (cf. Packer, 1985; Richardson, Fowers, & Guigon, 1999). 
Hermeneutics is an interpretive practice concerned primarily with developing a practical 
understanding of everyday lived experience. It is a counterpoint to the abstract constructs 
and ahistorical and acultural explanatory models that abound in present-day psychology in 
the U.S. Through their alternative conceptions of culture and the self, hermeneutic thinkers 
challenge taken-for-granted assumptions of U.S. psychology. Hermeneutic thought therefore 
has considerable promise for fostering more critical cultural awareness.
A Hermeneutic Model of Culture
In a hermeneutic model, culture is a set of shared meanings that structures and orients 
human existence, what Geertz (1973) famously called “webs of significance.” In this view, 
culture comprises the meanings shared by members of a social group—what they take to be 
“common sense.” These shared meanings make possible communication, joint activities, and 
relationships; and they give shape to personal identities. Cultural meanings entail layers of 
assumptions, pre-reflective understandings, canonical narratives, and moral visions. These 
meanings often are so commonplace that they are invisible; that is, they are “just the way 
things are.” Even something as biologically basic as sleep is configured in arrangements 
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imbued with cultural meanings (Shweder, Jensen, & Goldstein, 1995). The practice of 
infants and children routinely co-sleeping in the same bed as their parents is customary in 
much of the world, though it is sternly frowned upon by U.S. childrearing experts. 
Acceptance or prohibition of co-sleeping rests on cultural meaning, that is, shared 
ontological assumptions and related moral values related to personal boundaries, emotion 
regulation, individuation, independence training and sexual intimacy.
Two aspects of cultural meanings are particularly important for hermeneutic psychology: 
folk psychologies and moral visions. A folk psychology is a set of meanings concerning 
psychological life that is shared by a social group. Jerome Bruner (1990) defined folk 
psychology as
a set of more or less connected, more or less normative descriptions about how 
human beings ‘tick,’ what our own and other minds are like, what one can expect 
situated actions to be like, what are possible modes of life, how one commits 
oneself to them, and so on. (p. 35)
The term folk psychology is often invoked as a pejorative, to connote superstitious, old-
fashioned, irrational, or prejudicial ideas about human behavior; its antithesis is thought to 
be “scientific” psychology. By contrast, in the hermeneutic view, folk psychologies entail 
inescapable presuppositions about self and social relations that orient people in life and 
enable them to function (Geertz, 1973; Taylor, 1988, 1989). As Heelas (1981) put it, “it is 
not possible to live as a human being without having an idea of what it is to be a human 
being” (p. 3). Moreover, folk psychology forms the largely unacknowledged substrate of 
expert psychological knowledge (including scientific psychological knowledge). Any 
understanding of behavior (e.g., extraversion), emotion (e.g., anger), cognition (e.g., 
schemas), psychopathology (e.g., delusions or depression), or complex social practices (e.g., 
courtship or racism) rests on a folk psychology concerning what a person is and what a 
person is expected to do or experience in a particular situation.
Folk psychologies orient people not only to what is but also to what ought to be (Bruner, 
1990; Geertz, 1973). The “is” and the “ought” correspond roughly to what Geertz (1973) 
saw as the two overarching dimensions of culture: worldview and ethos. A worldview is a 
model of how things are, including assumptions about what resources, faculties, and 
capabilities persons have; what states of consciousness are accessible to a person; and where 
the boundaries of the self are. Ethos refers to the moral, affective, and aesthetic aspects of 
human life, including the “tone, character, and quality” of life and a people’s “underlying 
attitude toward themselves and their world” (Geertz, 1973, p. 127).
Folk psychologies function in part as moral visions, that is, they are constellations of 
assumptions and values that define what the person is and should be or become. Moral 
visions inform people about what is worthy, good, and desirable, and about what constitutes 
virtue, morality, health, and well-being. In this way moral visions provide guidance about 
how a person ought to behave, relate to others, think, and feel, as well as about what 
constitutes the good life and the good or ideal person. Moral visions orient people to what 
they should move towards—both in terms of personal qualities, characteristics, and virtues 
(e.g., courage and equanimity), but also in terms of social situations or societal arrangements 
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(e.g., volunteer organizations). Moral visions also inform people about what they should 
resist or avoid by laying out what is seen as unhealthy, immature, sinful or pathological. 
Taken together, moral visions provide the implicit criteria for people to assess who they are 
and how they “measure up;” in this way, moral visions are an intimate part of identity. 
Moral visions contribute significantly (albeit tacitly) to psychologists’ theories about 
children’s development, life satisfaction and happiness, gender relations, psychopathology, 
and effective psychotherapeutic practice (Christopher, 1996, 1999; Christopher & 
Hickinbottom, 2008).
Moral visions vary widely across cultural groups. Indeed, in conflicts between cultures, it is 
often moral visions that are in conflict. As recent events have shown, programs of social 
change (e.g., banning child marriage, headscarves, or circumcision, or ending female genital 
cutting); economic development (e.g., land redistribution or expanded educational 
opportunities for girls); and social reforms (e.g., declarations of universal human rights or 
movements to decriminalize homosexuality) necessarily engage people’s sense of what 
ought to be and what is good and worthy, as well as their motivations in living. When such 
programs of change are premised on the moral visions of high-income societies in the global 
North and imposed on societies in the global South, it is hardly surprising to hear 
accusations of neo-colonialism and cultural imperialism.
Two brief examples illustrate the practical import of cultural variation in folk psychologies 
and moral visions for psychologists. The first concerns suicide and deliberate self-harm. In 
the U.S., it is taken as common sense that suicide is a symptom of a serious psychiatric 
disturbance, typically a mood disorder. Virtually all textbooks of abnormal and clinical 
psychology assert this as an incontrovertible and universal fact, as do public education 
materials and prevention programs. Furthermore, the inclusion of “suicidal behavior 
disorder” as a condition for future study in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (5th ed.; American Psychiatric Association, 2013) suggests that suicidal behavior 
can be a psychiatric disorder in its own right. However, since Bruno Malinowski’s 
groundbreaking classic, Crime and Custom in Savage Society (1926), a steady stream of 
empirical evidence has shown that the meaning of suicide is profoundly culture-bound and 
not necessarily psychopathological. On the Indian subcontinent, for example, suicide and 
suicidal behavior, typically undertaken by individuals low in status, often serve as means of 
redressing grievances or protesting or evading unwelcome or illegitimate demands. The 
motivating force is anger, not depression, and the intention is to shame the wrongdoer 
(Marecek & Senadheera, 2012; Staples, 2012; Widger, 2012). Suicides in rural China have 
similarly been linked to familial grievances and the desire to avenge a wrong by publically 
disgracing the wrongdoer (Pearson, Philips, He, & Ji, 2002). In neither the Indian 
subcontinent nor the People’s Republic of China is suicidal behavior understood as an 
automatic sign of psychiatric disturbance. In fact, the diagnostic manual of the Chinese 
Society of Psychiatry specifically states that most Chinese individuals who commit suicide 
do not have mental illnesses (Chinese Medical Association, 1995, as cited by Pearson et al., 
2002). China and India cannot be considered as exotic exceptions to the general rule, as 
together they comprise over 36 percent of the world’s population. Indeed, with the U.S. 
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comprising only about 4 percent of the world’s population, one might consider the 
medicalized view of suicide as the exotic exception.
The second example is drawn from the research program of Peggy Miller and colleagues 
(e.g., Miller, Wang, Sandel, & Cho, 2002), which compared the upbringing of children in 
rural areas of the U.S. and Taiwan. Miller and colleagues spoke to caregivers (mothers in the 
U.S.; mothers and grandmothers in Taiwan) concerning their ideas about childrearing 
practices and goals. U.S. mothers, the researchers noted, emphasized bolstering their 
children’s self-esteem by providing love, affirmation, praise, and opportunities for success 
and by avoiding shame and harsh discipline. They viewed self-esteem as the foundation for 
a range of positive outcomes, such as academic success, happiness, moral autonomy, and 
mental health. The Taiwanese caregivers offered a sharp contrast. To begin, no direct 
translation of the term “self-esteem” existed in Mandarin Chinese. Even after the researchers 
made prolonged efforts to establish common ground around the meaning of self-esteem, the 
concept remained unintelligible to half the caregivers. For the others, high self-esteem was 
not a desired developmental outcome, but was thought to lead to psychological 
vulnerabilities such as stubbornness, low frustration tolerance, and unwillingness to listen to 
elders. For Taiwanese caregivers, childrearing centered on moral education and discipline, 
not on affirming a child’s worth. In both the U.S. and Taiwan, childrearing practices draw 
on and reaffirm folk psychologies and moral visions. At the same time, these practices shape 
the contours of the selves of both children and mothers. As the stark contrast between 
Taiwan and the U.S. shows, the notion that high self-regard is central to children’s well-
being is a local and historically specific one, not a transcultural principle.
These examples of suicide and child-rearing indicate the power and pervasiveness of culture. 
Hermeneutics offers tools that enable one to trace the interplay between cultural meanings 
and subjectivity. From a hermeneutic standpoint, selves are constituted through everyday 
activities and the meanings that are invested in those activities. The next section describes 
the hermeneutic view of self as embedded in and inseparable from culture. This is a view of 
self that differs considerably from that of conventional U.S. psychology. Insofar as the self 
is “an expression of culture” (Bruner, 1990), hermeneutics also provides tools to examine 
the interplay between cultural meanings and psychological theories, research, and practice.
A Hermeneutic View of Self
From a hermeneutic perspective, self and culture are inextricably linked. Indeed, selves are 
saturated with meanings based in the folk psychologies and moral visions of the surrounding 
culture. This is in sharp contrast to the individualist orientation that has dominated much of 
U.S. psychology, an orientation grounded in philosopher Rene Descartes’ assertion that 
what is most fundamental to the self is the “I”—the cogito or thinking subject. The Cartesian 
“I” emphasizes the rational, conscious, and deliberative mind, which is sharply separable 
from the society and culture that surround it. Following Heidegger’s lead (1927/1962), 
hermeneutic thinkers have challenged the Cartesian emphasis on the rational, conscious, and 
deliberative mind. In place of the “I” set apart from the world, Heidegger used the term 
being-in-the-world to argue that self and culture are inextricable—that human existence is 
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embedded in and constituted by social practices that are always already imbued with 
meaning.
Offering the example of a craftsman, Heidegger endeavored to describe being-in-the-world 
without invoking the usual Cartesian dualisms (e.g., self vs. object; self vs. other; thinking 
vs. feeling; mind vs. body). A craftsman, he observed, does not spend his day as an “I” that 
is fundamentally separate from the objects (e.g., tools, wood, and workshop) with which he 
is engaged. Instead, a craftsman works in a way in which his tools are an extension of 
himself. A hammer is not a separate object but something seamlessly connected to him in 
the way he works. At work, a craftsman is not rationally deliberative, nor does he perceive 
himself as detached from his work. Indeed, a craftsman regards a hammer as an “object” 
only if it breaks or no longer suits the task. Although a craftsman certainly is capable of 
thinking about his work in an abstract or deliberative mode, this is not his usual way of 
working. In Heidegger’s parlance, the craftsman is not “set over and against the world;” he 
is an engaged participant in a task given meaning by culture.
From a hermeneutic standpoint, much of what transpires in everyday life is best described as 
engaged practical activity, akin to that of the craftsman. Such activities are based on 
procedural knowledge that is typically pre-reflective and pre-conceptual. Although humans 
can develop some capacity to consciously define themselves and select their ways of living, 
this individual consciousness is only the tip of the iceberg. Humans come to know a world 
that is already imbued with value and meaning. In the U.S., for instance, middle-class 
parents routinely ask their children to indicate their own preferences regarding food, 
clothing, and toys; this culture-specific child-rearing practice inculcates a self that is marked 
by individuality. More generally, selves are already deeply formed by social practices and 
the cultural meanings and moral visions implicit in them before they develop the cognitive 
capacities to partially define themselves. In this way a hermeneutic account of how the self 
is formed is in contrast to the Cartesian view that people imbue the world with value and 
meanings that reflect their individual preferences. This hermeneutic view of the self is, in 
effect, the flip side of its view of culture. This is as it should be: For hermeneutic thinkers, 
self and culture are inseparable.
Individualism: A brief history—The Cartesian view of the self informs and inspires the 
individualist ideology that is core to the folk psychology and moral visions of present-day 
middle-class Americans. This ideology construes the self as separate from others, society, 
culture, and nature. In this construal, individuals are akin to atoms or billiard balls, in 
dynamic interaction but fundamentally independent (Bishop, 2007). U.S.-based psychology 
is permeated by individualism, as many observers have noted (e.g., Baumeister, 1987; 
Cushman, 1995; Richardson, Fowers & Guignon, 1999; Sampson, 1977).
Before we take up some ways that individualism inflects disciplinary thought as well as 
clinical practice, we set the stage by briefly describing the historical rise of individualism 
during the Renaissance, the Reformation, and the Enlightenment in Western Europe. In 
those eras, individualism served as an ideological resource that helped to emancipate people 
from the hierarchical, patriarchal, and authoritarian excesses of the Middle Ages 
(Macpherson, 1962; Taylor, 1989, 2007). Historically, individualism developed in parallel 
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with two related ideological shifts. One was the gradual rejection of the view that human life 
was part of an “enchanted,” purpose-laden universe or cosmos, for instance God’s plan 
(Lukes, 1973; Morris, 1987; Ullman, 1966). The emerging scientific view instead reduced 
the world to matter, which operated according to mechanistic natural laws. In the 
“disenchanted” scientific view, deeper purposes and meanings, including the intervention of 
supernatural powers, were rejected. The mature individual came to be seen as one who could 
create meanings rather than project worth and value onto the universe.
The second ideological shift—an outgrowth of the first—was a new way of imagining the 
self. Historically, most people have lived in “worlds of fate” with roles laid out for them 
before they were born (Berger, 1979). Identity was a matter of location in a social order: The 
son of a baker became a baker. In the Middle Ages, common people were believed to be 
lacking sufficient intelligence, faith, and courage to choose their own destinies or rule their 
own lives. They were expected to obey and trust religious, social, and political hierarchical 
orders. By recasting the individual as the possessor of his or her own being, Enlightenment 
philosophers helped to undermine such hierarchies and reduce their abuses of power 
(Macpherson, 1962).
As heirs to the legacy of individualism, people in the U.S. typically embrace a moral vision 
that places a high value on liberty, equality, autonomy, and privacy in both the political and 
personal domains. They esteem separation, individual expression, and differentiation as 
virtues (Kirschner, 1996; Lukes, 1973). Particularly if they belong to the middle class, they 
are urged to put aside received norms, values, and beliefs and instead “march to the beat of 
their own drum.” This is often deemed a quest for authenticity, and psychotherapists, 
counselors, and life coaches often assist clients in quests to determine what they as 
individuals want, need, believe, and value (Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler, & Tipton, 
1985). Maturity, in this view, involves being self-defining, that is, able to detach oneself 
from cultural binds and to choose who one will be and with whom one will associate 
(Taylor, 1989). For many, social groups are little more than arenas where self-contained 
individuals, who have already determined their interests, needs, desires, potentialities, and 
rights, express and act upon them. Without a social or cosmic order to define the good life, 
individuals are free to choose their beliefs, moral standards are no more than personal 
preferences, and well-being is no more than personal fulfillment or private gratification 
(Christopher, 1999; Christopher & Hickinbottom, 2008). It is not surprising that this moral 
vision downplays the import of culture.
Individualism in U.S. psychology—U.S. psychology, cut from the mold of a folk 
psychology of individualism, is likewise the heir to individualist ideology and a disregard 
for culture. U.S. psychologists are inclined toward what Geertz (1973) called stratigraphic 
models, which portray human existence as a series of concentric rings, much like an onion. 
Invariably, the innermost ring is biogenetic, with psychological, interpersonal, societal, and 
(finally) cultural domains successively layered onto it. Biopsychosocial models usually take 
this form. The implication is that the outer rings can be peeled off, leaving the core intact: 
The “bio” is the cake; the rest is frosting. Moreover, when culture is relegated to the 
outermost periphery of human experience, it is easy to disregard it. Indeed, stratigraphic 
models go hand in hand with a disciplinary division of labor that assigns the study of social 
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practices and structures to sociologists and the study of culture to anthropologists. 
Psychologists whose work crosses those boundaries (e.g., some feminist psychologists, 
critical race scholars, and proponents of indigenous psychology movements) are often 
subject to disciplinary policing (e.g., “That’s not psychology, it’s anthropology,” or “That’s 
politics, not psychology”). The disregard for culture is in contrast to a hermeneutic view in 
which culture inescapably and inextricably permeates human existence; it cannot be stripped 
away. Nothing in the social world or in what is mistakenly thought of as an inner self exists 
apart from culture. It is culture all the way down.
Contemporary therapies in the U.S. promulgate a moral vision steeped in individualist goals 
of self-reliance, autonomous choice, and self-realization. This moral vision shapes, inter 
alia, definitions of maturity, well-being, and mental health. Although this moral vision has 
long been criticized by feminists, critical theorists, multiculturalists, and others (e.g., Hare-
Mustin & Marecek, 1986; Sampson, 1977; Sue & Sue, 1977), it remains in force among 
mainstream psychologists. Moreover, many U.S.-trained psychologists appear to be unaware 
that in many societies, the pursuit of self-defined desires, wants, and needs is neither a moral 
imperative nor a marker of mental health (Dueck, Ting, & Cutliongco, 2007; Markus & 
Kitayama, 1991). Indeed, for most of the world (and throughout most of history), sources of 
meaning and visions of the good life are not a matter of purported “inner” dictates; rather, 
they come from external sources (Bellah et al., 1985; Taylor, 1989, 2007; Ullmann, 1966): 
harmonizing with extended family, kin networks, or society; obedience to or faith in a 
supreme being (as in Judeo-Christian-Islamic traditions); or aligning with the natural order 
of the cosmos (as in Taoism, Confucianism, Platonism, and many Native American 
traditions). In many traditions, the good or moral or religious life involves subordinating, 
dissolving, or transcending the self (as in Buddhist traditions), not amplifying it (Taylor, 
2007). Perhaps it is not surprising that philosophical and religious thinkers often look 
askance at the humanistic strains of U.S. psychology; in their view, these versions of 
“humanism” excessively privilege the self (Levinas, 1961/1969; Marion, 1991).
Psychologists trained in mainstream U.S. psychology face a further obstacle to recognizing 
how culture shapes psychological knowledge and practice. Resting assured that rigorous 
scientific methods ensure objectivity and value neutrality, psychologists have paid little heed 
to the ways that their worldviews and moral visions influence theory development, research, 
practice, and therapeutic processes (Cushman, 1995; Danzinger, 1990; G. Richardson, 
2010). Consequently, psychologists in the U.S. have devoted scant effort to developing the 
intellectual resources necessary to discern the impress of culture on the discipline.
Concluding Recommendations
Relegating culture to (or beyond) its margins has left three lacunae in U.S. psychology: 
First, whether in theories or in the extant knowledge base, little attention is given to the 
cultural grounding of human experience and social relations. Second, psychologists’ training 
does not provide them with the conceptual tools and research skills that would enable them 
to discern folk psychologies and moral visions that differ from their own. Third, because 
there is little acknowledgement (and sometimes adamant denial) that the discipline is 
grounded in the folk psychology and moral visions of a particular time and place, U.S. 
Christopher et al. Page 11
Am Psychol. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2015 October 01.
Author M
anuscript
Author M
anuscript
Author M
anuscript
Author M
anuscript
psychology has only a limited set of self-knowing structures that would enable disciplinary 
reflexivity. Inspired by hermeneutic views of culture and self, we offer several 
recommendations to begin to address these gaps.
First, increasing globalization raises the need for psychologists to learn about other folk 
psychologies, worldviews, and moral visions. Every society has a folk psychology 
consisting of characteristic ways of construing development, personality, group relations, 
psychological disturbances, and so on. Gaining knowledge of other folk psychologies is far 
from easy; it requires disciplined ability, time, and reliance on interlocutors. Yet, such 
knowledge is a prerequisite for doing meaningful and effective work across cultural 
boundaries, as well as for avoiding harm, as the example of the Asian tsunami relief efforts 
illustrated.
Second, clinical and counseling psychologists need to cultivate critical cultural awareness in 
order to devise appropriate and acceptable psychological interventions that can be applied 
across international boundaries or across cultural boundaries in the U.S. Viewing 
psychological theories and practices in cultural and historical perspective can lead to 
awareness of how radically alien these may be for others and raise questions about their 
appropriateness. For instance, within the U.S., immigrants and members of ethnic minority 
groups use mental health services less than native-born Whites; they also have higher rates 
of early termination (Vasquez, 2007). No doubt many factors contribute to this disparity, but 
a clash of moral visions—often involving resistance to the individualistic orientation of 
mainstream psychotherapists—is one such factor (Christopher, 1996). Such an orientation 
may color therapists’ views regarding pivotal issues such as familial obligations and loyalty, 
proper methods of childrearing, developmental milestones, conceptions of marriage; ideals 
of femininity and masculinity; ideals of honor and the necessity of protecting the family’s 
reputation; and acceptance of psychic suffering as God’s will or karmic retribution.
Critical cultural awareness goes far beyond multicultural sensitivity as it is often defined. 
Ideals of multicultural competence typically concern the actions of individual clinicians and 
demand only modest accommodations. (“Don’t offer to shake hands with a Muslim 
woman.”) At its worst, training in multicultural competence risks presenting little more than 
a Baedeker of ethnic stereotypes. In comparison, critical cultural awareness demands a 
consideration of the moral visions and ideas of personhood that underlie clinical 
interventions, along with the recognition that any psychotherapy – however tailored or 
adapted by an individual therapist – is a cultural artifact (Marecek, 2006; Wendt & Gone, 
2012). As Kirmayer (2012) noted, the literature on evidence-based practice is “grounded in 
individualistic notions of the person” and the “categories used to identify problems, measure 
outcomes, and organize interventions may not fit specific cultures well” (p. 251).
Third, it is time to set aside the “rhetoric of objectivity” that pervades much of U.S. 
psychology (Dillon, as qtd. in Madigan, Johnson, & Linton, 1995, p. 433). Philosophers 
from many traditions concur with the hermeneutic position that cultural values and 
assumptions are present in all forms of knowledge production (Bernstein 1978; Bishop, 
2007; Fleck, 1935/1979; Hacking, 1999; Taylor, 1989). Critical psychology movements in 
the UK, South Africa, Canada, India, the Nordic countries, and elsewhere have begun to 
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delineate how ideologies and folk psychologies shape all psychological theories. For too 
long, U.S. psychologists have dismissed non-Western psychologies out of hand as culture-
bound. Once we acknowledge that U.S. psychology too is culture-bound, little justification 
remains for maintaining the firewall between “them” and “us.” By tearing down this 
firewall, U.S. psychologists can take a first step toward engaging respectfully with 
psychologies other than their own.
Fourth, beyond learning about other psychologies, psychologists need to be open to learning 
from them—that is, to re-assessing or even revising their own ways of thinking. The 
psychologies of Buddhism and Yoga, for instance, blur the sharp distinction that Western 
thought has drawn between religion and philosophy, on the one hand, and psychology, on 
the other. Moreover, other cultures may yield practices that have useful applications in 
clinical psychology and behavioral medicine in the U.S. Meditation and mindfulness-based 
practices are ready examples. Learning from other cultures involves being open to practices 
that may not involve professionalized services, credentialed clinicians, or medicalized or 
“health”-oriented frameworks (e.g., Csordas, 1997; Echo-Hawk et al. 2011; Gone & Calf 
Looking, 2011; Kakar, 1982).
Fifth, U.S. textbooks in many areas of psychology are rife with claims stated in universal 
terms that are in fact particular to the U.S. Those claims often presume that the organization 
of the life course, gender arrangements, societal and family structures, and value orientations 
are universally shared. Textbooks, of course, cannot document the full extent of cultural 
variation across the world; however, their accuracy would be substantially increased if 
writers acknowledged the cultural specificity of their evidence base. Such an 
acknowledgment would also foster students’ cultural awareness.
Sixth, interdisciplinary training is an important way to provide psychology students with a 
robust and sophisticated knowledge of culture. A genuinely liberal arts education provides 
conceptual tools to think about alternative systems of meanings, as well as the perspective to 
engage in disciplinary reflexivity regarding psychology. For instance, knowledge of other 
disciplines (e.g., anthropology, history, sociology, philosophy, and religious studies) can 
help situate the discipline of psychology historically and culturally. At the same time, these 
disciplines offer tools for research and conceptual analysis that reach beyond 
experimentation and quantification.
Seventh, psychologists who wish to study people in culture would do best to incorporate 
empirical methods that move outside traditional laboratory experiments and quantitative 
measures. As Geertz (1983) put it, the goal of research is to understand “what [people] 
perceive ‘with’—or by means of,’ or ‘through’” (p. 58). Such shared meanings and their 
import for subjectivity and social relations are best observed by “catching sight of [people] 
as [they] are engaged and preoccupied in everyday living” (Guignon, 1984, p. 232), as well 
as through trying to understand participants in their own terms. Qualitative research methods 
are particularly well suited for these kinds of inquiry, and also are more likely to be utilized 
in partnership with local communities. Qualitative methods that have been used or 
developed within a hermeneutic framework include ethnographic observation (Geertz, 
1973), interpretive phenomenological analysis (Smith, Flowers, & Larkin, 2009), and a 
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family of methods developed by discursive psychologists (Magnusson & Marecek, 2012; 
Potter, 2012; Wetherell, 1998), among many others. In addition, contemporary qualitative 
inquiry in the social sciences has included “indigenous methodologies” that prioritize 
community control and participation in the research process (Kovach, 2009; Smith, 1999; 
Wiggins, Ostenson, & Wendt, 2012). The urgent need for critical cultural awareness among 
psychologists suggests the time is ripe for qualitative inquiry to have a much more 
prominent and visible role in U.S. psychology, alongside quantitative methods.
Eighth, we urge readers to realize that critical cultural awareness may be a demand in the 
near future rather than an optional add-on. Indigenous self-determination movements, which 
demand greater local control of research and health care services, are growing (McFarland, 
Gabriel, Bigelow, & Walker, 2006). In Canada, for example, First Nations have established 
institutional review boards that are likely to require researchers to share decision-making 
with the community and justify their goals, theoretical commitments, and procedures (cf. 
Canadian Institutes of Health Research, 2007); in the U.S., Tribal Nations and Native 
Hawaiians are beginning to do the same. As another example, the Pondicherry Manifesto of 
Indian Psychology (2002), drafted by three leading (Asian) Indian psychologists and signed 
by more than 150 others, excoriated Indian psychology as a “Western transplant, unable to 
connect with the Indian ethos and concurrent community conditions.” As a result, according 
to the Manifesto, Indian psychology had been unable to “play its necessary role in our 
national development.” Proponents of indigenous movements from other parts of the world 
too have objected to the Western values and assumptions that are imported with research 
and interventions (Alfred, 1999; Battiste, 2000; Smith, 1999). In short, although the utility, 
worth, and beneficence of their theories, models, and interventions may seem self-evident to 
U.S. psychologists, their presumptions may not be shared by those from different cultural 
backgrounds.
Ninth, regardless of the scientific and pragmatic issues involved, it is an ethical imperative 
to take seriously the perspective of the other (Christopher, 1996; Teo, 2010). Neglecting the 
moral visions of other peoples risks dehumanizing them or pathologizing them—treating 
them, to use Buber’s (1970) terms, as an “it” instead of a “thou.” As hermeneutic thinkers 
have pointed out, truly engaging with others requires a radical openness to them that can 
lead to a “fusion of horizons”—a melding of outlooks that transforms participants 
(Gadamer, 1960/1975, p. 358). Hermeneutic dialogue demands that we encounter others as 
if their ways of life, beliefs, and values are potentially on an equal footing with our own. 
Such a radical openness reaches far beyond multicultural competence, with its connotation 
of mastering a skill. It demands instead what Tervalon and Murray-Garcia (1998) have 
called cultural humility or, as Bullock (2011) put it, a “learning attitude, including reflection, 
humility, appreciation of privilege, and appreciation of cultural contexts and explanatory 
frameworks that stretch boundaries” (p. 9).
In conclusion, as U.S. psychologists and psychologies traverse international boundaries, it is 
imperative that they no longer imagine themselves to be value-free or capable of rising 
above culture. Science—whether in the form of methodological controls or evidence-based 
practice guidelines—cannot produce “pure” forms of knowledge unaffected by the knowers’ 
place in historical time and geographic space. Because global connectedness is projected to 
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increase dramatically in the foreseeable future, U.S. psychologists need to apprise 
themselves of the moral visions and folk psychologies that are embedded in their own 
assumptions, methods, and practices. Hermeneutic thought, along with the research methods 
it has inspired, provides tools for examining the ways that culture shapes human experience, 
and the ways that culture—in the form of folk psychologies and moral visions—shapes 
every psychology.
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